Centre for Fiji Financial Intelligence Unit

The Fiji Financial Intelligence Unit yesterday opened a National Anti-Money Laundering Learning Center which will provide electronic computer based training (CBT) to financial institutions and stakeholders. FIU director – Razim Buksh says the AML Learning Center and the CBT courses will be of tremendous value to Fiji’s law enforcement agencies as their officials will be trained without any cost. CBT courses will cover topics such as money laundering, human trafficking, precursor chemicals, search techniques, control deliveries and basic intelligence analysis. Buksh says the course will ensure that relevant authorities have a better understanding and skills to combat complex crimes in Fiji.

“The main reason for providing such a training forum to law enforcement agencies is basically the nature of crime is quite complex, this is a new era, and we have seen emergence of complex crime in Fiji. Therefore we need to equip our law enforcement agents – so that they are at par with the new methods and techniques. These include coming up with a matrix, linking information through flow charts and link charts and undertaking better management of information if this relates to financial record.” The Learning Center has been established through a partnership between the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, the British High Commission in Suva, Reserve Bank of Fiji and the Fiji Intelligence Unit.

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Sweden launches criminal investigation of U.S. intelligence activities

Swedish prosecutors launched a formal criminal investigation into "unlawful intelligence activity" conducted by the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm, according to a statement posted Monday on the Swedish Prosecution Authority's website. The statement comes two days after Swedish security police announced they were looking into the activities. The investigation began when U.S. Embassy officials told authorities its employees had been conducting surveillance similar to what was recently discovered in Norway. Head prosecutor Tomas Lindstrand said the criminal investigation concerns actions taken to protect American staff and the United States' post in Stockholm. The criminal investigation will establish whether crimes have been committed, he said.

The scale of surveillance is not known, but according to a security police statement Saturday, operations have been ongoing since 2000. They were conducted without the knowledge of the Foreign Affairs office, the Justice Department, the security or the local police in Sweden, the statement said. "I think it's regrettable they have conducted these activities without informing Swedish authorities." Sweden's Justice Minister Beatrice Ask told reporters Saturday, "I think it is very serious if these activities have been carried out in breach of Swedish law." The U.S. Embassy in Stockholm released a statement Saturday that recognized the existence of a program to detect suspicious activities around U.S. facilities, and pointed to past terrorist attacks as evidence for why such a program is necessary.

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Cargo security analysis: bringing intelligence to bear

Intelligence must be at the root of any effective cargo security regime, but there is a need for certificated systems capable of screening whole cargo pallets and large items. That is the view of the International Air Transport Association, which on 2 November opened its security-focused AVSEC World conference in Frankfurt - just days after intelligence-led security checks on a UPS aircraft in the UK and a FedEx Express facility in Dubai uncovered PETN explosives in packages originating in Yemen. The message from providers of screening systems, meanwhile, is that the technologies required to ensure cargo security are available, and what is lacking is a global standard to govern their use. Yet IATA's view on the primacy of intelligence appears to be a point of consensus.

In his address to AVSEC World, IATA director general Giovanni Bisignani argued that cargo security required co-operation between governments and industry in investment, processes, technology and risk assessment. For example, the association sees potential for its e-freight programme - a paperless documentation system launched as a cargo analogue of its e-ticketing initiative - to generate data that could be used to manage security "intelligently and efficiently without compromising speed". Industry's role is not confined to airlines, stresses Bisignani. "The entire supply chain from the manufacturer to the airport has a responsibility to secure shipments," he says. He sees the UK and USA as "well advanced on supply-chain solutions", with the former nation operating a regulated agent system and the latter a certificated cargo-screening programme, in which responsibilities are split between shippers, forwarders and manufacturers. IATA aims to "help all governments develop a similar approach".

This article was written for Flightglobal.com by Niall O'Keeffe. Flightglobal.com is a specialized online news and information website related to the aviation and aerospace industries.

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The Threat of Politicized Intelligence

If new US National Security Adviser Thomas E. Donilon needs a reminder of how stark the enemy threat is, he need look no further than today's discovery of printer cartridges rigged like explosive devices aboard UPS airliner cargo holds that left Yemen bound for Jewish Synagogues in the United States. A dry run? You bet. And not just to test the holes in air cargo security systems, but to test the reaction time and responsiveness of our national security apparatus.

The backroom maneuvering that led to Donilon's ascent and the departure of his predecessor, Gen. James L. Jones (USMC Ret), is a dangerous reminder of what happens when politics enters the world of intelligence gathering, analysis and policy-making. Donilon, whose reputation as a backroom Democratic Party wheeler dealer precedes him, would do well now to shed that skin and get down to the serious business at hand in containing and controlling threats that are approaching four-dimensional complexity against American--and global--security interests.

History is replete with bad decisions made by men and women charged with securing America who lamely, selfishly and often purposefully politicized intelligence for narrow political objectives. Those failures should serve as a reminder to Donilon and the team he assembles that America's enemies are lurking and waiting for any sign of weakness to attack us. And attack us they will.

During both the Clinton and Bush presidencies, political machinations repeatedly overtook good judgment in assessing the vast amounts of intelligence gathered by the most formidable surveillance apparatus the world has ever known. Bill Clinton repeatedly ignored warnings and advice from people in and out of government about the storm brewing inside Islam's radical fringe. On September 11, 2001, the hypothetical threat--ignored and politicized for so many years--became a harsh reality. We are living with the consequences of that misjudgment today.

Much of the failure to deal with militant Islam inside the Clinton presidency came from his national security team, which (with the exception of former counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke) had little practical experience with military campaigns, counterterrorism strategies, guerrilla warfare tactics or other facets so critical to ensuring modern-day security. They repeatedly, and with increasing stridency, politicized intelligence gathering, analysis and policy responses. Sudan, on which I write from personal knowledge and experience, was a prime example of what America can never afford to allow again.

This article is taken from The Washington Post "On Leadership" Guest Insights and its particularly relevant in today's intelligence environment.

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The Uses and Misuses of Intelligence in Four US Wars

President Harry S. Truman created the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 to ensure that the policy community would have access to independent intelligence analysis that was free of the policy advocacy of the Department of State and the Department of Defense. The CIA's most important analytic mission was the production of national intelligence estimates (NIEs) and assessments that tracked significant political and military developments and provided premonitory intelligence on looming threats and confrontations.

One gauge for measuring the success of the CIA's intelligence analysis is to measure the Agency's performance before and during four controversial wars: Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Three presidents (Truman, Eisenhower, and Johnson) did not interfere with the production of intelligence analysis in these crises; two presidents (Nixon and George W. Bush) tried to slant intelligence analysis; and now President Obama is fighting a war without benefit of the estimative capabilities of the intelligence community.

President Truman wanted sensitive intelligence with the bark on, and that is what he and President Dwight Eisenhower got from the CIA during the Korean War. Unfortunately, the CIA made a series of fundamental errors in its judgments, including failures to understand the policies and actions of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, ascertain the nature of Kim's dialogue with the Soviets and the Chinese, provide strategic warning of Kim's decision to go to war, and anticipate China's entry into the war.

As a result of these failures, President Truman named the first civilian director of the CIA - Allen Dulles - and supported the creation of an elite Office of National Estimates (ONE) under Harvard Professor William Langer, a senior Office of Strategic Services (OSS) analyst during World War II. ONE consisted of two offices, an upper tier known as the Board of National Estimates (BNE), composed of senior government and academic officials, and an estimates staff composed of intelligence professionals who drafted NIE's. ONE quickly became the focal point of the CIA's intelligence analysis until it was abolished in 1973 by CIA director James Schlesinger, who shared the Nixon administration's desire to end ONE's independence and its dominance within the intelligence community.

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Bending Intelligence to Political Purposes

Intelligence, it is commonly said, is inherently fallible. And the conventional wisdom is that people tend to see the world as they expect to see it and so are slow to change their minds.

If that is true, policymakers' decisions based on such intelligence analysis and mind-set should be executed carefully. There is nowhere that is more crucial than on the Korean peninsula. Their overall judgments also must be speedy, accurate and taken with great care, especially in assessing an undercurrent of the soon-to-be-declared power shift in North Korea. Far too often, the deepest and most authoritative country analysis is colored by the administration in power in the South.

Ten years or so ago, for instance, some North Korea analysts at government-financed institutes in the South proudly enjoyed likening the North to "a ship on fire in mid-ocean with a hold full of ammunition." A handful of then-senior colleagues at Korea's Blue House joined their top decision-maker who allegedly claimed in a telephone conversation with his counterpart at the Clinton White House that the North would collapse within six to 24 months.

Of course, it's not sure whether their assenting opinions were deliberately made to support official policy under the conservative Kim Young-sam government. But other pessimistic Korea watchers imagined that if the power succession should fail to proceed, millions of people would likely abandon their homes and move in hordes across the countryside, hastening to the northwest side of the Chinese frontier to search for a better life. The roads would be crammed with hungry refugees, people clinging onto the steps of the trains or crowded upon their roofs.

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Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan

This paper, written by the senior intelligence officer in Afghanistan and by a company-grade officer and a senior executive with the Defense Intelligence Agency, critically examines the relevance of the U.S. intelligence community to the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. Based on discussions with hundreds of people inside and outside the intelligence community, it recommends sweeping changes to the way the intelligence community thinks about itself – from a focus on the enemy to a focus on the people of Afghanistan. The paper argues that because the United States has focused the overwhelming majority of collection efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, our intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate and the people we are trying to protect and persuade.

This problem or its consequences exist at every level of the U.S. intelligence hierarchy, and pivotal information is not making it to those who need it. To quote General Stanley McChrystal in a recent meeting, “Our senior leaders – the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, Congress, the President of the United States – are not getting the right information to make decisions with ... The media is driving the issues. We need to build a process from the sensor all the way to the political decision makers.” This is a need that spans the 44 nations involved with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
This paper is the blueprint for that process. It describes the problem, details the changes and illuminates examples of units that are “getting it right.” It is aimed at commanders as well as intelligence professionals, in Afghanistan and in the United States and Europe.

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Mass of Data, Analysis Failures Main Culprits of Christmas Day Attack

The botched terrorist attack on Christmas Day was a failure of intelligence analysis and not information sharing, the two former chairs of the 9-11 Commission testified today. "The greatest single challenge that arises from this incident in our view is the urgent need to strengthen the analytic process," former Rep. Lee Hamilton and former Gov. Tom Kean said in prepared testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

They were joined by Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano and Director of the National Counterterroism Center Michael E. Leiter, both of whom testified earlier this morning before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Reform with Dennis C. Blair, the director of national intelligence. Members of both committees focused on how to correct the intelligence and security failures that allowed Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a 23-year-old Nigerian, to board a flight from Amsterdam with high explosives sewn into his underwear, despite numerous indicators that should have landed him on the country's No-Fly List.

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The Khost Attack and the Intelligence War Challenge

As Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi exited the vehicle that brought him onto Forward Operating Base (FOB) Chapman in Khost, Afghanistan, on Dec. 30, 2009, security guards noticed he was behaving strangely. They moved toward al-Balawi and screamed demands that he take his hand out of his pocket, but instead of complying with the officers’ commands, al-Balawi detonated the suicide device he was wearing.

The explosion killed al-Balawi, three security contractors, four CIA officers and the Jordanian General Intelligence Department (GID) officer who was al-Balawi’s handler. The vehicle shielded several other CIA officers at the scene from the blast. The CIA officers killed included the chief of the base at Khost and an analyst from headquarters who reportedly was the agency’s foremost expert on al Qaeda. The agency’s second-ranking officer in Afghanistan was allegedly among the officers who survived.

Al-Balawi was a Jordanian doctor from Zarqa (the hometown of deceased al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi). Under the alias Abu Dujanah al-Khurasani, he served as an administrator for Al-Hesbah, a popular Internet discussion forum for jihadists. Jordanian officers arrested him in 2007 because of his involvement with radical online forums, which is illegal in Jordan. The GID subsequently approached al-Balawi while he was in a Jordanian prison and recruited him to work as an intelligence asset.

Al-Balawi was sent to Pakistan less than a year ago as part of a joint GID/CIA mission. Under the cover of going to school to receive advanced medical training, al-Balawi established himself in Pakistan and began to reach out to jihadists in the region. Under his al-Khurasani pseudonym, al-Balawai announced in September 2009 in an interview on a jihadist Internet forum that he had officially joined the Afghan Taliban.

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'System Failure' In U.S. Screening For Terrorists

The White House concluded in a report issued Thursday that "a series of systematic breakdowns" contributed to the failure to prevent the failed Christmas Day bombing of a trans-Atlantic airliner bound for Detroit. The unclassified summary of the swiftly completed review said the unsuccessful attack exposed failures when it came to assembling and analyzing disparate pieces of intelligence, as well as gaps in the U.S. government's procedures for placing potential terrorists on federal watch lists.

Obama admitted that spy agencies had collected, but failed to connect, pieces of information that should have led authorities to pay greater attention to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian student who allegedly tried to blow up Northwest Flight 253. "At this stage in the review process, it appears that this incident was not the fault of a single individual or organization, but rather a system failure across organizations and agencies," President Obama said on Thursday.

He ordered a set of changes in counterterrorism procedures, including how the watch list system operates, as well as new efforts to develop more sophisticated explosives detection technology for airport screening checkpoints. The White House review found the complex system of maintaining multiple watch lists "is not broken," but John Brennan, the deputy national security adviser who supervised the review, said the process of feeding information into the watch list system must be strengthened.

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Mexico's Cartel Criminals Manipulate Police Intelligence

Proactive security and organized crime interdiction in Mexico is being seriously compromised in at least three critical facets of national security. Those being military, diplomatic and police intelligence capabilities. The main issue that prevents the use and deployment of sound intelligence initiatives in Mexico is simply trust.

The murders of government officials, police, and military throughout Mexico are not an exaggeration of an ungovernable situation nationwide or along the U.S. border. The use of strategic and tactical intelligence as a prelude to decision and action within Mexican enforcement circles is often challenged by unauthorized disclosure. Expected damage from such leaks is resulting in rivers of blood and associated carnage. Much of this attributed to the execution of clandestine sources of narco-trafficker informers.

Twelve bodies of off-duty military intelligence officers dumped in Michoacan state, ambushed and executed by the La Familia cartel in July of this year, are graphic examples of the cartel’s reach through compromised intelligence elements. Politicians of several Michoacan cities that included seven mayors and a state prosecutor were arrested and jailed on charges that included their protection of the cartel. An arrest warrant for federal lawmaker Julio Godoy, of the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and the half-brother of Michoacan state Governor Leonel Godoy, was also issued

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Product Review and the Egoless Office

There is a paradox in intelligence analysis that may, or may not, be readily noticeable. That apparent contradiction is that to work best in a team situation a crime or intelligence analyst should really be able to map their ego , cut it out, and leave it safely at the door before entering the office. More than most any other place of employment or endeavor; the intelligence office is not a place for egos getting in the way of a polished and useful intelligence product. Inflated egos and infighting can cause an intelligence product to be defective and this can mean higher crimes rates and damaged lives. Why is it a paradox, you ask? Because analysts are usually highly intelligent, well trained and balanced individuals who have a definite point of view. However, they operate in an environment where educated opinion must be checked and re-checked against all available information to produce actionable intelligence.

Intelligence is not fact and never exact; but is a tool to direct finite resources to the areas of greatest possible effect. It may be based on certain, specific facts, but is not fact in its own right. This is because intelligence operates in the realm of prediction and gaps with parts of it being subjective. And, of course, subjectivity can be dangerous. The methodology used to reduce the risk of subjectivity producing erroneous prediction is to establish a healthy and robust product review mechanism. This would involve both peer and supervisory review and editing of intelligence products submitted formally for dissemination.

Robust intelligence products that meet the needs of operational police, law enforcement, and public safety officers are best created in an atmosphere of mutual trust. This is where each member of the team put individual fears and prejudices aside and works for the common good to bring together the best possible result. Difficult as this may be at times, this is a win-win for all concerned.

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Analyst Skills: Peer Review

The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines peer review as: "A process by which something proposed (as for research or publication) is evaluated by a group of experts in the appropriate field." In a law enforcement fusion center or intelligence unit peer review is a critical component in report or product creation. Peer review can be very useful as it suggests different perspectives and provides valuable feedback on what is compelling and what is problematic in a document.

Intelligence in law enforcement basically covers two areas, intelligence analysis and crime analysis. Both of these fields create products for the decision maker that can be enhanced and edited by ones own work colleagues. This is because co-workers generally have sufficient knowledge of the subject matter and are in a unique position to enhance the product through their input.

Peer review however, is not without its problems. Some find it very difficult to critique other people's work, or put their own efforts up for peer evaluation. This is understandable, considering that so much effort goes into intelligence products. Personality clashes can interfere with clear analysis of peer performance, as can fear of other people 'stealing' ideas or just not wanting other analysts to see your work.

However, peer review is a vital cog in the intelligence office machine. It adds extra pairs of eyes looking at the problem being examined. It can identify gaps in reasoning and provide solutions to those gaps. Peer review can show an author where grammar, punctuation or spelling can be improved. It is for the purpose of product improvement that peer review exists. Thus a much more accomplished final result is available to the supervisor or manager at the outset, saving time and showing the skills of the analyst in a better light. in the long run, both the writer and the reviewer become better skilled and more proficient at their craft. Losing a little bit of fear is not a bad thing either, so give peer review a try!

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17 dead in Pakistani car bombings

A pair of bombings in Pakistan killed at least 17 people, including security officials, and wounded dozens of others Friday, officials said. Ten people died and at least 60 were wounded when a massive car bomb targeted the intelligence agency that plays a central role in Pakistan's anti-terrorism campaigns, said Mian Iftikhar Hussain, information minister for North West Frontier Province.

The 800-pound bomb ripped through the Inter-Services Intelligence's provincial headquarters, collapsing large parts of the multistory building in central Peshawar. Hussain said seven of the dead were security officials and several others were thought to be buried under the rubble. Rescue teams were working to remove debris to find survivors.

Ayub Shah, whose house is about one-tenth of a mile from the blast site, said he had just come home from morning prayers when he heard gunfire. That lasted about a minute, then he heard the blast, which shattered windows at his house.

A second explosion hit North West Frontier Province's Bannu District, southwest of Peshawar. In that attack, a suicide bomber rammed his car into the Bakka Khel police station, killing seven, five of whom were policemen, and injuring 23 others, said Bannu police Officer Oranzed Khan.

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Universities Gear Up to Satisfy Job Growth in the Intelligence Sector

With U.S. government hiring to increase significantly over the next three years, especially in the area of national security and protection, universities are beefing up their educational offerings to produce more highly educated intelligence specialists.

The opening of the Great Plains National Security Education Consortium, composed of four universities in Nebraska, underscores the findings of a recently released study entitled "Where the Jobs Are," which identifies over 270,000 government employment opportunities available in the next three years. The North Platte Telegraph reports that the new program will focus on academic subjects such as physics and engineering, language and cultural immersion and statistical analysis. The goal is increase the pool of people, particularly women and minorities, qualified for careers in the intelligence sector.

As the newest of 14 such educational programs, it will help prepare students for jobs with federal agencies who gather intelligence, including the CIA. "The intelligence community needs brainpower, to challenge our way of thinking, to allow for the cross-fertilization of ideas," said Lenora Peters Gant, director of the government's Office of the Centers of Academic Excellence.

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US Intelligence Budget $75bn per year

A U.S. top intelligence official disclosed on Tuesday that the country has spent about 75 billion US dollars a year on intelligence. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair told reporters when he introduced his 2009 National Intelligence Strategy, that intelligence activities across the government and military cost a total of 75 billion dollars a year, which accounts for more than 10 percent of the annual U.S. defense budget at 650 billion dollars or so.

The strategy includes the full budget figure for the national intelligence program, including the government's 16 intelligence agencies and the military counterparts. It was the first time for the U.S. government to disclose the overall cost of intelligence activities including those related to the military.

Under pressure from lawmakers and human rights groups, the U.S. government has taken some measures to make its intelligence spending more transparent, whose total amount was kept confidential before 2007. In 2008, the Bush administration only disclosed the amount spent by the 16 intelligence agencies, at 47.5 billion dollars, but the military intelligence program was not included.

• "U.S. spends $75 bln a year on intelligence: official", Xinhua, 9/16/09.
• "The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America, August 2009.
  

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US to open intelligence training center

General David Petraeus plans to open an intelligence organisation at US Central Command this week to train military officers, covert agents and analysts who are willing to focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan for up to a decade, The Washington Times reported on Monday. The organisation, the Centre for Afghanistan Pakistan Excellence, will be led by Derek Harvey, a retired colonel in the Defence Intelligence Agency who became one of the Petraeus’ most trusted analysts during the 2007-08 counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq by predicting in 2003 and 2004 that the Iraqi insurgency would spiral out of control.

In an exclusive interview with The Washington Times, Harvey said the centre would build on some of the lessons that he and the military had learned in Iraq, not just for counterinsurgency, but also in terms of intelligence analysis. He said he believed in two reforms in developing reliable intelligence; the first involves altering the methods of interpreting raw data. He said the intelligence community tends to rely too much on information from human sources, such as spies, to the exclusion of reports from people on the ground such as military officers and aid workers. He said the new centre would focus on integrating all sources of information to develop strategic products for both war fighters and decision makers in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

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The White Noise of Intelligence: Finding Relevance with Interactive Analytics

Centrifuge Systems, Inc., a leading provider of next generation business intelligence software, recently published a new white paper for the US Intelligence Community (IC) entitled "The White Noise of Intelligence: Finding Relevance with Interactive Analytics".

This white paper describes how Interactive Analytics works and includes case studies in the areas of Threat Finance and Cyber Security Analysis. Examples of domain relevant visualizations in the form of heat maps, relationship graphs, timelines and maps are displayed for each case study. The use of collaborative analysis is also highlighted in the paper.

Interactive Analytics (IA) is an analyst-centric approach to understanding data in support of better decision making. It brings together three modern innovations in analysis: Interactive Data Visualization, Unified Data Views and Collaborative Analysis. IA is widely used by US Government agencies in some of the most demanding applications in the world including cyber security, financial crimes, homeland defense and counter-terrorism applications.

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Federal government has too many intelligence contractors

The Obama administration and Congress now believe the practice of outsourcing core duties is, at best, undermining the federal workforce and, at worst, harming national security -- an observation also noted by the federal intelligence community.

An internal 2008 staffing review conducted by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence reported that contractor employees made up 29 percent of the workforce at the 16 intelligence agencies, but the contractors cost the equivalent of 49 percent of the personnel budget.

These expensive contractors perform support functions like human resources and information technology, but have also been hired to perform crucial mission functions like interrogate prisoners, collect intelligence, and analyze data.

In response to the staffing review, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence passed a 2010 intelligence authorization bill earlier this month that would force agencies to reduce their use of contractors by 5 percent.

"Insourcing Government Intelligence", Oh My Gov! 7/29/09.

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MEXICO UNDER SIEGE: The drug war at our doorstep.

The Los Angeles Times provides an interactive website that constantly updates the cartel based drug war in Mexico. There are lists of individual stories, photographs, an interactive map, numbers of homicide victims and more. If you are working narcotics intelligence, this website would be a great resource.

To access the website, please click here.

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